In early 1984, SAC wanted to go to the new synthetic hydraulic fluid, Mil-H-83282 vice the petroleum-based Mil-H-5606 to enhance safety, since the synthetic fluid had a higher flash point and was therefore, deemed safer. Problem was that a) the synthetic was much more viscous at lower temperature, and b) the FB (all -111s, in fact) had 2 "dead-end" hydraulic subsystem (where fluid didn't "pass through" a component but stopped at and worked an actuator or control valve. They happened to be the nosewheel steering and brakes. Concern was that Plattsburgh AFB historically experienced some number of days each year that were -60 degrees F (ambient, not including wind chill, since the airplane didn't care about wind chill). It was therefore possible, that using the synthetic hydraulic fluid and given the timing of an alert response scenario and historic Plattsburgh weather, a bomber crew could respond to a klaxon, fire up their engines, taxi out, and be unable to either turn OR brake, likely turning the FB-111 into a snowplow. Not a pretty thought.

I was at HQ SAC as the FB-111 Program Manager. I had people from both KPSM and KPBG OMS and FMS TDY to assist me. LTC Rich Young, 393 BS, whose back was still messed up from jumping out of 68-0242 during Red Flag in Jun, 1983, was my alert-qualified crew member. We used 67-0159. the SM-ALC test bird, as our test aircraft. Looked like a "real" FB, but it did have P-3 engines and splitter plates/translating cowls. We put the aircraft up on jacks and tied it down...tight...to compress the shock struts and engage the MLG/NLG squatswitches, so the aircxraft would think it really was on the ground...instead of "flying" 10' in the air. The Hangar air-make-up people would then create a given test environment--think we started at 0 degrees--and we'd sound a surrogate klaxon, send Rich running out and up the B-2 stand, jump in his decidely cold jet, crank it up, and we'd measure how long it took the NWS and brakes to operate satisfactorily. We'd actually have engines running while the airplane was jacked up. The biggest problem., however, was the huge volume of air the TF-30 engines would suck down. While we could simulate Alert timing okay, there was no extra time to do much other time testing. The TF-30s would suck down the cold air within minutes, causing the temps to start rising rapidly inside the hangar, especially when we got to -40 and less.
There are a hundred stories and anecdotes that came out of that TDY. We did finally prove that the synthetic fluid wasn't acceptable for use in the FB, since KPBG winter temperatures could preclude proper brake and NWS system operation in some Alert scenarios. SAC stayed with -5606 at that time.

Thanks to Donald Green (TSGT USAF RET) for providing the photos above. Click on the thumbnails to see a larger photo.