There is a note worthy story behind this “Buy None” exercise flight from Lockbourne. The alert force
exercise initiating the evaluation resulted in the collision of 2 KC-135’s taxiing out from the alert force
parking ramp at Lockbourne. The subsequent fire totaled one KC-135 and resulted in the death of 3 of
the aircrew. This event happened March 8, 1973, nearly 38 years ago, and my recollection of that day’s events may need correction. Anyone with addition data or corrections may freely do so.

The story starts at the Lockbourne alert facility. While sitting around in the facility I recalled noting how young and how GUNG HO our host base’s KC- 135 aircrew’s appeared. I commented about this to one of the more senior Tanker crew members. He agreed with my observation and made the additional comment that the squadrons crew member experience level was so low that the flying schedule was predicated on the availability of a qualified pilot to serve as Supervisor of Flying (SOF). Being an “old dog” Captain with 10 year’s service I filed this little nugget of information in the back of my mind. It came to serve me well two days later! March 8, 1973 at around 4:45 AM the alert Klaxon sounded at Lockbourne. The alert facility quickly turned from a quiet darkened facility to the usual mad house during alerts… flashing red lights, the klaxon screaming, people yelling and bodies running throughout the rooms and hallways. Dave and I quickly dressed and were running for the “mole hole “doors and our alert vehicle. As we ran down the exit ramp I recalled hearing a starter cartridge fire on one of the tankers. Wow, I thought, those KC-135 crews are really fast reacting. I also thought to myself this is going to be a “real fun” exercise if we have intermingled FB-111’s and KC-135’s taxiing in the dark. Dave and I jumped into our alert vehicle and raced out to our FB and climbed into the cockpit. Dave authenticated the exercise message while I quickly performed the start engines sequence. I was highly experience in alert starts as a former ADC F-101B Voodoo driver and quite adept at rapidly throwing switches in the cockpit. My intention was to get taxiing well ahead of any tanker to avoid being overrun by those BIG BIRDS and their GUNG HO aircrews! Around the time I activated the cross bleed switch to start the second engine a radio call is heard….. KC-135 collision and fire. We were unable to observe the collision site as we were located in the alert shelter and the tankers were off to the right and behind us. As the second engine spooled up the thought went through my mind…two EWO loaded tankers on fire…that makes 350,000 pounds of fuel waiting to go up and we are not very far away… let’s get out of here pronto. I energetically signaled the crew chief to pull the chocks and rapidly flashed the taxi lights. I called out to Dave ...ready to taxi...clear right, clear right …he replied wait a minute the Inertial Navigation System (INS) alignment light is still blinking… we can’t move or the INS will tumble. The INS tumbled. Nothing like an aircraft on fire next to you to get one moving.

We were first out of the shelters by a long shot. As I recall Lockbourne had few if any ramp lights and the taxiway and runway lights were at a very low setting that night. It was a real challenge taxiing on a pitch black night on an unfamiliar ramp and taxiway. Taxiing out from the alert shelter I never had time to turn my head to the right to look at the KC-135 ramp and burning aircraft. I turned onto the runway and pushed the throttles well forward to get the heavy beast moving. I was sure whomever was following me would also have their throttles well forward. I kept a good amount of power on until abreast the tower at the mid- point of the 12,000 foot runway. I think the IAS tape moved at that point and it provided the first clue I was moving too fast for an aircraft weighing approximately 108,000 pounds. My throttles quickly went to idle and a lot heavier foot pressure than usual was applied to the brake pedals to slow down the aircraft for the taxiway turnoff. I taxied the aircraft to the mid-point of the parallel taxiway and stopped about 6,000 feet from the burning tanker. I figured we were safe there and that location left sufficient space on the taxiway to park the other 2 FB’s and the 4 unscathed KC-135’s while leaving the runway open in case it was needed.
Now the fun began. After a few minutes waiting on the taxiway I keyed the mike and transmitted …. Command Post this is Blade 11 we are located on the parallel taxiway with engines running what instructions do you have for us? Silence. Repeat call. Silence again. Etc, etc, etc. Ten or more minutes pass. The command post is not talking to us or anyone else. Not a word is spoken on the radio. Sunrise has now arrived and we can clearly see the burning KC-135. The fire department is spraying foam and water on the burning fuselage and attempting to shut down one of the tanker engines which was locked at a high power setting by shooting a stream of foam into it. (One tankers wing tip had sliced into the fuselage of the other tanker just aft of the cockpit, jamming the engine throttle linkage full open. It had also filled the cockpit with burning fuel.)
Still no contact with the Lockbourne Command Post. WE attempt contact with SKY BIRD. Silence again. The command post…the repository of all knowledge, wisdom and infallibility is totally, and I mean totally, silent. After about 20 more minutes of this I tell the other FB’s I am going to shut down my engines. The other two FB’s follow suite and we exit our aircraft. Security police arrive to guard the aircraft and maintenance personnel install cartridges so that we can start the engines again if needed. I do not remember who told us everything was cancelled and to go back to the Alert facility. Later that afternoon we retrieved the CMF Box from the aircraft and leave them in the CP. I recall the Command Post/ DOX personnel were none too happy to have to baby sit the “go to war tickets”. For the next two days all six of us FB-111A aircrew members maintained a very, low profile and quietly tip-toed around Lockbourne before leaving to fly the bombing mission portion of the “BUY NONE.” To the best of my knowledge no one ever asked any of us about the accident. SAC eliminated night moving exercises for the alert force after this accident.

Jim McKinley, 715th Bomb Squadron, Jan 1970- June 1973
Wing CVI, July 1984- August 1989